Science and Faith (or an assumption by any other name)
Posted by: Fritz. in Logic, Philosophy, Science, Semantics, UpdatedI ran across a blog today that vehemently denies that science is faith-based. While this is a tempting position to stake out, particularly in light of the cultural wars raging across the blogosphere, it shows a disturbing misunderstanding of the underpinnings of science and logic.
Phil Plait states: “The scientific method makes one assumption, and one assumption only: the Universe obeys a set of rules.”
So what is wrong with definition of the basis for the scientific method? Not much. While I prefer two rules: The physical universe exists and it follows a consistent, understandable, and most importantly, observable set of rules. These are just clarifications to Phil Plait’s original rule.
What I have a serious problem with is the implied distinction between what an assumption is and what faith (in something) is. There is no real distinction. But, you might argue, this is an argument over a semantic point. OK. I’ll agree to that it is an argument over a semantic point. Unfortunately, when one is arguing about the underlying meaning of something, one is arguing semantics. And there is no real semantic distinction between an assumption — I choose to accept a statement as true for the basis of argument — and an article of faith — I choose to believe something without the benefit of supporting evidence. In both cases one is choosing to believe something is true. What is different is the purpose of that belief.
It might be that the problem here is the baggage that comes along with the word “faith”. There is an implication that faith is blind while an assumption that is the basis of the scientific method is validated by its utility. That is to say, that the assumption that the universe exists and that it has rules is born out by observation, both casual and diligent. But this leads us into a logical loop. The assumption of rules leads to the finding of rules, which is taken to be evidence that supports the assumption that rules exist, and we are back at the assumption again.
One might ask where I come by this belief at the core of scientific thought. It comes from an analytic philosopher I admire a great deal, A.J. Ayer, who argues in The Problem of Knowledge, there is no basis for real knowledge. He then goes on to point out that while this may seem to be a bankrupt view of the world, that a simple act of faith can easily support the glorious edifice that is scientific thought and the wonders of practical engineering sheltered therein. The important thing to note about the belief that the world exists and that it is understandable, is that this belief is completely internally consistent. Everything derivable from this belief can be derived through observation and manipulation of that universe. No additional assumptions are necessary. And that is a faith that I am more than comfortable with.
I would be interested in hearing your thoughts on this “semantic quibble” at the heart of modern science.
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To the skeptic, simply getting out of bed requires the leap of faith that the floor will be there to meet her feet, and the world will be there when she opens her eyes. It all gets down to the unprovable assumption that the future will continue to resemble the past, to borrow a page from Hume. But as Hume also observes, nobody can actually live a life like that. And when you start conflating that kind of “leap of faith” with the kind of faith that is the basis for religion, you’re engaging in sloppy thinking and dangerously blurring some very important distinctions.
The thing about premises in logical reasoning, or axioms in mathematical systems, or assumptions in the project of science, is that it’s possible to take them on board while remaining agnostic as to their “real truth”. Just because you stipulate an axiom that parallel lines never meet, in order to do Euclidean geometry, doesn’t mean that you have to adopt some sort of belief that Euclidean geometry is true and Lobachevskian geometry is false. Mathematicians switch from Euclidean to Lobachevskian geometries all the time, and back, without undergoing any sort of crisis of faith or other emotional disruption. They don’t have to make any avowals that what they wrote about the other system was wrong and false in order to work in a different one. Contrast this to the behavior of people who undergo religious conversion experiences.
Likewise, in order to do science you have to presume that there are observable rules in order to carry on the project, but you don’t have to believe that that’s the way The Universe Really Is. The map is not the territory, and science is just a map. Doing science does not require one to claim that it’s the only map, or that the map perfectly reproduces the territory, or that the map is True, just that it’s the map that you’re working on right now. Other maps may be equally useful in order to do other projects. In other words, you can *do* science without any deep-seated beliefs about the fundamental truth of the premises of science, just like you can do modal logic without any deep-seated beliefs about the ‘truth’ of modality. You cannot do religion, you cannot profess faith, without engaging in deep-seated beliefs about the fundamental truth of your religion. That deep-seated belief in the truth of the religion you profess is what faith in that sense *is*. A belief so deep-seated, in fact, that it is not susceptible to disproof. Faith, in the religious sense, must operate even when all the evidence says otherwise.
(I no longer have a pointer to the essay, but I read a fascinating piece a couple of years back arguing that if you wanted to create a meme with vigorous growth and strong survival potential, you could do a lot worse than inventing one that makes its holders impervious to contrary evidence.)
Now, as a matter of fact, there may be a great many scientists who happen to believe in the premises of science. But that belief is supererogatory. They don’t have to have it in order to do science. In religion, that belief is not supererogatory. It’s necessary. In fact, it’s foundational. So, as I say, calling the two types of belief the same blurs some very important distinctions.
Uli - Hmmm, I see your point about the “rootedness” of the beliefs. On the other hand, I don’t think Phil Plait is using “assumption” in the same way you are using it above. He seems to be using it more in the nature of “faith”. More later. Must run to my writer’s group.
I’m not seeing good evidence for that presumption, but I don’t think it really matters. Phil Plait isn’t the Delphi Oracle; he can be wrong, too. The point is, that conflating the way scientists work with the way religious believers work is bad reasoning, and just hands ammo to some really toxically stupid arguments, not least the ones in favor of teaching “Creation Science” or “Intelligent Design” as science in public schools.
Or, to put it in very simple terms, an assumption you make in order to do science can be made provisionally, subject to better evidence. The “assumptions” (plural, and complex) necessary to religion cannot be made provisionally. If you make them provisionally, subject to revision upon better evidence, that simply is not Faith.
Uli -
The notion of “faith in the truth of perception”, as I will call Hume’s (and Ayer’s) unprovable assumption, is at the core of our experiences. I disagree that when I equate “faith in perception” and “leap of faith” necessary for religion, which I will limit to the Western notion of “faith in (a monotheistic) God” for the purposes of this discussion, is conflation of different concepts. This equivalence, I believe, is one of perception. That is, “I perceive the world” and “I perceive God” (or, if you prefer, replace “perceive” with “believe in”) are logically equivalent Neither of them can be proved and both form the foundation for a world view.
As to the distinctions between these forms of faith, I agree that there important distinctions. But these distinctions derive from the interaction of the foundational faith with the world view derived from them. They are not distinctions of fundamental form. While belief and faith are not interchangeable in English, they are logically equivalent in that they both represent the acceptance of something as true without support.
Your point about adopting “assumptions” agnostically is a good one, and I certainly agree that belief in the truth of assumptions or axioms for mathematics is true. I also suspect that most scientists do not worry about, if they are even aware of, the foundational rule(s) of science. And this does not prevent them from conducting science. I will quibble about the relationship to of belief to the use of the scientific method, though. I don’t equate the scientific method with science, which I see akin to equating a hammer or saw with carpentry. The scientific method is a tool which can be used without belief or understanding of science. My quibble here is that I would argue that (for human) tool users there is a belief or faith in the the *utility* of the tool, or the tool would not be used.
I disagree that “doing religion” requires a deep-seated belief in said religion. I don’t expect to convince you of this. I’ll just add an observation that has lead me to believe it. I have been exposed to a culture, namely Japan, where there is a casual adoption of various religions by segments of the population on a sort of “just in case they’re right” basis. I suspect this stems from the fact that some religions are just more tolerant about the (contradictory) beliefs of other religions in their adherents.
Back to the relationship between the foundational beliefs of science to its world view and religion to its world view. In science, the relationship between that there is a causal world and the explanation of the that world is rule based. If you have an explanation about some aspect of the world (i.e. a theory) and series of controlled experiments support that theory, then you have the justified belief that that theory is true. On the other hand, the relationship between the foundation belief of a religion, such as God exists, and some fact (perceived or not), such as the world exists, is declarative. That is to say, God wills it. In my mind, the problem with this is that religions strength is basically explicative and has almost complete lack of predictiveness. Science does both explanation and prediction.
- Fritz.
You realize that you just introduced a third thing that you’re claiming is the same as the first two? Faith in the truth of perception is yet again a different concept from making an assumption that the universe is rule based, and also a different concept from partaking of religious faith. One of the most important things that Western philosophy is useful for is observing distinctions between things that seem similar and separating out the tangled concepts into distinct ideas. You seem to be engaged in the opposite project: taking existing distinctions and muddling them together and calling them all the same. I’m not sure what the utility of that project is, but it isn’t one I’m interested in.
Sorry, I shouldn’t have introduced the word “perception” into this and stuck with “believe in”. I was struggling with notion how to express “perception of belief” and “belief” together. Its one of those “I believe that I believe” sorts of things.